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I
Introduction
An important feature of developing country policies in thelast decade has been the enactment of Competition Actsas part of a pro-competition policy [Hoekman 2002].
While a multilateral competition policy is no longer a part of
the agenda of the WTO, the Doha declaration of 2001 relates
competition policy to trade policy and emphasises reinforcement
of competition policy in developing countries through capacity-
building.
India too has substantially improved the competition climate
in its manufacturing sector since 1991 via a series of changes
in both domestic and trade polices. However, as avenues for
competition have increased, at the same time the government has
also put in place a set of regulatory agencies with the objective
of promoting competition. As trade theorists are prone to argue,
if the economy is open to market forces, then the market players
would themselves enforce competitive outcomes. This would be
particularly true for countries ( like India) which are classified
as small countries in the world economy with a share of world
trade under 1 per cent. If this proposition is accepted, then it
would follow that the only objective of regulatory agencies would
be setting the rules of the game rather than monitoring the degree
of competition. Yet, the terms of reference of the regulatory agencies
often include a clause requiring the active promotion and moni-
toring of competitive forces [see, for example, Competition Act
2002; Electricity Act 2001]. One hypothesis commonly quoted
in the literature is that imports can raise the level of competition
in the domestic industries and reduce profit mark-up. The theo-
retical framework and econometric specification for this kind of
study are provided by Levinsohn (1993) and Metin-Oxcan (2000).
However, the empirical evidence on this is at best inconclusive.
Levinsohn (1993) tests the imports-as-market discipline hy-
pothesis in case of Turkey in the light of reduced import protection
in the decade of the 1980s and reduction in tariffs, though to
a lesser extent in some of the manufacturing industries. The
estimation of an oligopolistic structural equation model revealed
that price mark-up (price/marginal cost) declined in imperfectly
competitive industries in which protection declined and increased
in imperfectly competitive industries in which protection in-
creased. From this result Levinsohn concludes that the results
can be taken as evidence for supporting the imports as market
discipline hypothesis.
In a similar exercise, Krishna and Mitra (1998) try to study
the impact of trade liberalisation on certain sectors of the Indian
manufacturing sector, namely, electronics, electrical machinery,
non-electrical machinery and transport equipment. The estimated
mark-ups defined as profit/(raw material cost+ energy consump-
tion expenditure+wages) decline after liberalisation except in the
electrical machinery industry, thereby confirming the market
discipline hypothesis. However, the effect of liberalisation on
technology and hence productivity is ambiguous depending upon
the conditions of the home country. However, there also exists
some literature that does not support the hypothesis very clearly.
In a study pertaining to Australia, Jayanthakumaran (1999) runs
separate regressions to find the effect of liberalisation on labour
productivity growth, export growth and changes in the price-cost
margin.1  He found that labour productivity is negatively, but
weakly related to change in the effective rate of protection. The
growth in exports has been negatively related to the effective
rate of protection and positively related to the internal demand
variable (implying improvement in productivity and increased
intra industry trade) and index of scale variable (implying in-
creased impact of entry barriers). However, the result that stands
out is that the influence of change in the effective rate of
protection on price cost margins has been negative implying that
openness has not reduced price cost margins. For this, two
explanations have been forwarded. Firstly, it could be a case
where there is a monopoly element at work in the Australian
industry. Moreover, the effective protection estimate is the mere
reflection of the pricing policy, which in this case would tend
to diminish slowly over time. Secondly, the effect of labour
productivity on price cost margins is positive and hence the author
concludes that the increase in labour productivity has been
transformed into higher price cost margins.
Harrison (1994) has tested for changes in productivity and
market structure due to trade liberalisation in the manufacturing
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sector of Cote de’Ivoire. In a Cournot setting of firm behaviour
she found that mark-ups (price/marginal cost) do decline in the
heavily protected sectors after trade liberalising measures are
implemented, but not in the case of other sectors. She also found
that price cost margins are higher in sectors with lower import
penetration and higher tariffs. Changes in productivity growth
due to openness were also assessed using three approaches, viz,
differentiating between pre-reform and post-reform, low and high
tariff regimes and low and high import penetration period. It was
found that open trade policies increased productivity.
Metin-Ozcan et al (2000) also analysed the changes in market
concentration and accumulation patterns in the case of Turkey for
the period 1980-96. They found that openness has a very small, but
negative influence on industrial concentration. They also found
that openness reduces profit margins, though to a lesser extent, while
concentration and real wage costs increases profit margins to a
greater extent. The study concludes that the outward orientation of
the economy has not brought much benefit in terms of the extent
of reduction in industrial concentration and the authors attribute
this to institutional and technological barriers in the country.
Roberts (1998) has dealt with the changes in industrial con-
centration in Poland between 1988 and 1993 to evaluate the
effects of trade liberalising measures in 1989. She found that
though the average concentration for the industry as a whole has
declined in the period, in some sectors concentration has actually
increased. The sectors in which concentration has increased were
previously less concentrated, with high capital-output ratio and
shrinking demand. They also found that among the less concen-
trated industries, competition has increased in the consumer
industries. The latter trend is due to tougher price competition.
The objective of this study is threefold. First, an attempt is
made to quantify how the policy changes have increased the
competiveness of the Indian manufacturing sector. Second, we
estimate the role of trade policy in promoting competition. Third,
we estimate the changes in the degree of monopoly power in
Indian manufacturing industry in the last decade. In the following
section we indicate our main database. In Section III, we first
investigate if the changes in domestic and trade polices since
1991 have in fact promoted competition. In Section IV, we outline
the explanatory model used to estimate the impact of polices on
a measure of competition. Here, we also set out and estimate
a model to measure the degree of monopoly power. Finally, in
Section V, some policy conclusions are noted.
I
Database
The primary source of data for the empirical exercises of this
paper is the PROWESS database of the Centre for Monitoring
the Indian Economy (CMIE). This database contains information
on about 8,000 companies, which includes companies that are
public, private, cooperative, joint stock, listed or otherwise. This
wide coverage encompasses almost 70 per cent of the economic
activity of the organised sector, both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing (our focus remains essentially on the manufac-
turing sector of the Indian industry). CMIE’s methodological
framework for data standardisation, via formal validation and
quality control, render inter-year, inter-industry and inter-com-
pany data comparable. The variables used in the equations of the
models below have been constructed from data taken from the
PROWESS database. The econometric testing in Section IV are
based on balanced panels. The time period of our study is 1989-
2001 for which data was available.
II
Policy Changes after 1991
The most important policy change after 1991 was the Industrial
Licensing Policy of 1991 which significantly improved the
conditions of entry for both domestic and foreign firms. Our
database allows us to quantify this entry in terms of the date of
incorporation of new firms after 1989. While this is an imperfect
measure in that it does not imply new production starts, nor does
it control for bogus firms, nevertheless it does indicate the
intentions and perceptions of new firms.
The data in Table 1 clearly indicates the big rush for entry of
new firms, particularly in the first period after 1989 and till 1995.
The reduced numbers after 1995 probably reflect the adjustment
of new entry to the size of the domestic market and the fact that
the growth rate of sales across all industries declined perceptibly
after 1995 [Das and Pant 2004]. Another possible indicator of
Table 1: Gross Entry of New Firms in Manufacturing in India,
1989-2003
Sector 1989-1995 1996-2003
Manufacturing 1656 284
Food and beverages 285 23
Textiles 251 26
Chemicals 394 95
Non-mettallic mineral products 96 12
Metals and metal products 153 20
Machinery 338 122
Transport equipment 28 23
Services 1002 128
Source: PROWESS database.
Table 2: Share of Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) in
Aggregate Sales of the Industry, 1988-89–2000-01
Sectors April 1988 to April 1994 to April 2000 to
March 1989 March 1995 March 2001
Mining PSE Share No of PSE Share No of PSE Share No of
(Per Cent) Firms (Per Cent) Firms (Per Cent) Firms
Coal and lignite 100 6 99.47 8 98.2 7
Crude oil and natural
gas 100 2 97.38 2 99.17 3
Minerals 65.97 5 57.97 7 62.24 8
Electricity (gen+dist)
Electricity 54.19 6 64.43 7 73.31 7
Service(fin+non fin)
Financial service 31.77 2 81.48 69 80.31 89
Health service 0 0 1.48 1 0 0
Hotel and tourism 26.05 2 16.08 4 11.55 3
Recreational service 0 0 0 0 4.63 1
Transport service 88.6 8 76.28 8 76.51 11
Communication 100 3 51.24 3 62.6 2
Trading 78.62 15 48.42 20 46.06 17
Construction
Construction 30.42 7 22.75 8 5.55 10
Irrigation
Irrigation 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manufacturing
Chemical 65.74 31 59.06 42 64.79 39
Metals and metal
product 53.78 12 41.6 15 30.26 13
Non-metallic
minerals 7.74 4 3.51 4 1.37 5
Textiles 12.73 16 2.68 14 1.85 16
Transport equipment 13.33 14 9.67 16 4.17 14
Machinery 39.04 18 21.98 33 15.04 25
Food and beverages 4.42 2 0.64 6 0.74 8
Note: Authors’ calculations from PROWESS database. PSE excludes
departmental undertakings.
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the changing nature of competition is the relative share of public
sector enterprises (PSE) and private sector enterprises (PVT) in
total sales. This is shown in Table 2.
As is clear from Table 2, the share of PSEs has declined in
most cases, barring some service sectors like financial services.
For our purposes, the most noteworthy is the decline in the share
of PSEs in manufacturing sector sales. The limited fall in the
case of chemicals is explained by the dominance of state-owned
oil companies. It is pertinent to note that the declining share of
the PSE is due to new entry of private sector enterprises. This
is clear from the fact that privatisation of PSE has not been an
important factor in contributing to a declining share of PSE in
sales. According to the Economic Survey, 2003-04, the total stock
realisation from privatisation proceeds in the period 1991-92 –
2001-02 of Rs 260 billion accounts for only 10 per cent of the
flow of manufacturing output in 2001-02.
The pro-competition stance in trade policy has been equally
remarkable. Apart from making the exchange rate more market-
oriented, the main thrust of trade policy changes have been to
reduce quantitative restrictions on imports, reduce import tariffs
and end selective protection for the small-scale industries. This
is clear from Tables 3, 4 and 5.
While the purist may argue that the decline in tariff protection as
shown in Table 4 does not imply a decline in effective protection,
other studies have shown that the level of effective protection
even at the disaggregated industry level follows the same trend as
nominal tariffs [see, for example, Das and Pant 2004; Nouroz 2001].
Finally, we have tried to measure foreign entry as foreign direct
investment (FDI). Here we calculated the share of foreign com-
panies ( defined as those with more than 10 per cent foreign
equity) in total industry sales for our reference period. The
disaggregated data is shown in Table 6, which presents a mixed
picture. While in about half of the industries the share of foreign
companies has increased, in the others it has declined. Signifi-
cantly, in the case of the pharmaceutical sector, the share of
foreign companies has declined quite perceptibly.
The primary purpose of this section was to show that policy
changes since 1991 considerably eased the conditions of entry,
both for domestic and foreign firms. In particular, our data shows
that the share of the government sector (PSE) declined quite
remarkably in some cases, indicating that the manufacturing field
was opened up for greater private sector initiative. More spe-
cifically, there seemed to have been considerable scope for
market-based competition after 1991.
IV
Econometric Models and Results
In this section, we will first investigate the hypothesis that
imports exert a significant negative impact on the level of profit
mark-up of firms. This is the most commonly used hypothesis
in the literature. Other variables given below are used to control
for domestic factors that influence mark-up.
Imports-as-Market-Discipline Hypothesis
The regression model for testing this “imports-as-market-
discipline” hypothesis is usually specified as:
(–)  (+) (–)  (–)
Mark-up = f (openness, CR4, wage, foreign, ind dummies, time
dummies)
Table 3: Changes in Quantitative Restrictions
Total number of tariff lines as on 01-04-1996 10202 (10 digit)
Tariff lines freed as on 01-04-1996 6161
Tariff lines freed for import during 1996-97 488
1997-98 391
1998-99 894
1999-2000 714
2000-2001 715
Source: Economic Survey, various issues.
Table 4: Average Nominal Import Tariffs, 1991-2004
Year Tariff
(Per Cent)
1991-92 Reduced to 150
1992-93 110
1993-94 85
1994-95 65
1995-96 50
1996-97 50
1997-98 45
1998-99 45
1999-2000 40
2000-01 35
2001-02 30
2002-03 25
2003-04 20
Source: Economic Survey, various issues.
Table 5: Changes in Number of Items Reserved for SSI
Year Items Reserved Items on Remaining Items under
for SSI OGL Reserved List
1998-99 821 478 343
1999-2000 812 576 236
2000-2001 812 643 169
2001-2002 799 799 NIL
Source: http://www.smallindustryindia.com/policies/preseve.htm
Table 6: Shares of Foreign Companies in Total Industry Sales,
1989-2001
(Per cent)
Sl No Sector 1989 1995 2001
1 Auto ancillary 14.30 17.72 15.61
2 Automobile 13.44 25.74 36.30
3 Beverages and tobacco 61.71 65.69 64.43
4 Cotton textiles 5.54 5.89 4.43
5 Drugs and pharmaceuticals 46.68 30.43 20.01
6 Dyes and pigments 40.97 29.71 28.84
7 Electrical machinary 33.57 30.88 25.39
8 Electronics 16.08 14.00 12.51
9 Fertilisers 0.25 2.20 0.02
10 Financial services 44.43 7.87 7.71
11 Food products 16.15 14.23 14.88
12 Inorganic chemicals 7.42 7.73 5.89
13 Metal and metal products 1.40 3.14 5.85
14 Non-electrical machinary 13.84 20.21 20.66
15 Non-metallic mineral products 2.87 3.98 5.99
16 Organic chemicals 8.75 4.96 5.02
17 Other chemicals 61.98 44.48 44.13
18 Other textiles 1.82 3.77 3.83
19 Paints and varnishes 17.44 23.21 22.79
20 Pesticides 37.04 31.76 46.99
21 Petroleum products 0.54 1.09 0.78
22 Plastic products 5.80 4.00 5.68
23 Polymers 1.33 2.03 6.46
24 Soaps and toileteries 63.38 47.44 38.02
25 Synthetic textile 0.68 2.00 12.80
26 Trading 3.11 3.41 3.08
27 Transport service 0.47 0.93 1.02
28 Tyres and tubes 19.49 9.96 8.61
Source: PROWESS database.
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The independent variables that feature on the right hand side
of the equation above have been computed using data from the
PROWESS database of the CMIE and are defined as follows:
(1) Mark-up: Profit/ (raw material cost+ energy consumption
expenditure + wages).2
(2) Openness: This is a measure of the relative openness of the
firm and is computed as the total trade (exports + imports) as
a ratio of sales.
(3) CR4: Is a measure of the concentration of market share with
the top four firms and is calculated as Σ4i=1si , where si is the
share of sales of the ith firm.
(4) Wage: This is the real wage cost of the firm and equals wage
expenditure/CPI for industrial workers.
(5) Foreign: Is the share of foreign company sales in an industry.
A foreign company is defined as one with 10 per cent or more
of foreign owned equity.
(6) Ind dummy: This is the industry specific dummy variable.
(7) Time dummy.
The signs expected for the first four explanatory variables are
given in parenthesis above, if we accept the hypotheses that
greater external openness and freer domestic entry promotes
competitiveness in the sense of lowering the mark-up. We con-
ducted the analysis in a panel regression for the period 1989-2001
using balanced panels. For our final results, we dropped obser-
vations with extreme values (=0) for openness and foreign and
excluded those industries with number of firms less than 10,
leaving us with 18 industries.3 The actual results are given in
Table 7 for a panel regression with fixed and random effects.
The industry dummies were highly collinear (for intercept dum-
mies) with CR4 reflecting industry specific differences. Hence,
we ran the final regression only with CR4. We also ran mul-
tiplicative dummies for CR4 and openness ( results not given
here). All multiplicative dummies were significant. However, the
impact of CR4 and openness on mark-up remained the same as
in the simple regression. The regression also indicated a concave
non-linear impact of openness and CR4 on mark-up.
We see that openness raises profitability, a result opposite to
that obtained by Krishna and Mitra (1998) in their study using
firm level data (CMIE) of four industries over the period 1986-
93. We interpret our result as openness capturing efficiency
factors rather than competitiveness. In other words, industries
that are more open are likely to be more efficient and therefore
earn a higher rate of profit. The force of competitiveness is
captured in our model by foreign presence in the industry, which
has a negative impact on profit mark-up. Finally, our results
indicate that highly concentrated industries also have higher
mark-ups. However, the causality is not very clear. In other words,
it is possible that high mark-up is a consequence of greater
efficiency that leads to greater concentration. This issue needs
further investigation.
Degree of Monopoly Power
Another measure of departure from competitive behaviour that
has been recently applied in econometric modelling is the Lerner
index. Since it is difficult to measure marginal cost, which is
a component of the Lerner index, Harrison (1994) and Krishna
and Mitra (1998) have adopted a production function approach
in which labour, material and capital are the three inputs. As-
suming that the market is Cournot-oligopolistic, they totally
differentiate the production function and use the firms’ first order
conditions of profit-maximising input choice to arrive at the
following equation which can be estimated:
dyijt = µj [αl dl + αm dm]ijt + (βj – 1) dKijt/Kijt
+ dAjt/Ajt + dfit/fit
where y, l  and m are the logarithm of the output-capital, labour-
capital and material-capital ratios for firm i in industry j and year
t, αl and αm are shares of labour and material in sales, β is a
returns to scale parameter, with βj = 1 indicating constant returns
to scale, Ajt is an industry specific index of Hick-neutral technical
progress and fit is a firm-specific parameter which allows for
firm-specific differences in technology. µj is the j-th industry’s
product price divided by its marginal cost whose relation with the
Lerner index is obvious. In implementing this model for the Indian
case we have generated z ≡ [αl dl + αl dm] and dk ≡ dK/K and
regressed dy on z and dk. The model was run for 24 industries
for the period 1995-2001.4
The following variables were generated from PROWESS data
base.
(1) Share of labour: Wages/sales
(2) Share of materials: (Total raw material expenses+energy
expenses)/sales
(3) Material cost: Total raw material expenses + energy expenses
(4) Capital: K0 + It, K0 is the benchmark year capital stock, which
is in our case is 1989. It = GFAt – GFAt-1, where GFA is gross
fixed assets. To get the replacement cost of plant and machinery
GFA of the company has been multiplied by a number which
is (a) 3 if incorporation year is 1965 or earlier, (b) 2 if incor-
poration year is later that 1965 but earlier than 1980 and (c) 1.5
if incorporation year is later than 1980. The investment figures
used in the capital stock estimation have been deflated by Machine
Tools Price Index with base = 1981-82.
(5) Sales: Sales in Rs crore, to get sale in real terms we have
deflated sales figures by wholesale price index. This has been
used as a proxy for output.
(6) Labour: No data are available in PROWESS for employment,
though latest figures have just started coming in for some
companies. So we had to do a mapping with the Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI) data for generating employment figures. This
required three steps: (i) data on total emoluments and total
employment were taken from ASI for various 3-digit industries.
Using these data, emoluments per employee was computed.
(ii) Considering the nature of the industry, the firms in the sample
were matched with the 3-digit industrial classification of ASI
and (iii) for each firm, the series on salaries and wages obtained
from PROWESS was divided by the computed series on emolu-
ments per employee for the 3-digit ASI industry, yielding an
estimate of labour employment in the firm. The results of the
estimation are given in Table 8.
Table 7: Result of Panel Regression
Dependent Independent Coefficient
Variable Variable
Random effect model Mark-up Openness 0.17
Real wage cost -0.08
CR4 0.005
Foreign share -0.42
Constant -0.037
N = 5788
Wald-chi square=30
NB: All the variables are significant at less than 5 per cent level, except the bold
ones. Hausman specification test rejects the fixed effect.
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For almost all industries the coefficient of z is greater than
one and significant, indicating prevalence of monopoly elements
in the industries. On the other hand, the estimates of the coef-
ficient of dk clearly show absence of scale economy. The price-
marginal cost divergence is quite substantial in most industries
and this divergence cannot be justified by existence of internal
economies of scale.
An issue of equal interest is the question of what happened
to our price-cost mark-up ( z) over time? Ideally, one would like
to compare the period after reforms in 1991 to that before.
Unfortunately, for our database, no data is available prior to 1989.
What we however try to see is whether the coefficient has declined
over the 10-year period after the reforms of 1991. In line with this,
we divide our reference period into the period before and after
1995. If reforms have deepened competition, we should find that
the coefficient z is significantly lower in the second period. To
test this hypothesis we used a multiplicative dummy in Model
2 of Table 8. The regression was run separately for each of the
industries shown in Table 8. To avoid clutter we summarise the
results of our regressions in Table 9, indicating whether there
is a statistically significant difference in the value of z before and
after 1995 and whether the z in the latter period is higher or lower.
An examination of Table 9 indicates that in 14 of the 24
industries the price-cost mark-up has either increased or not
changed by the end of the decade. Of the remaining 10, two are
residual categories ( other textiles and other chemicals) and one
is a service sector ( trading). The remaining seven manufacturing
sectors where the Lerner price-cost margin has declined are
electronics, fertilisers, food products, metal and metal products,
non-metallic minerals, tyres and rubber, and synthetic textiles.
Since the second period (1996-2001) was also a period of slower
growth for the economy as a whole it would be useful to see
if the decline in margins is due to increased competition or due
to the slow down of the economy. In any case, one cannot hold
any presumption that the price-cost margins have seen a general
decline with the opening up of the economy. Clearly, sector
specific competition issues need to be highlighted.
V
Conclusion
Our study of the policy changes after 1991 indicates that both
domestic and trade policies were changed significantly to pro-
mote competition in the manufacturing sector. We then used some
simple econometric models to see the impact of greater com-
petition on profit mark-up over the last decade. The econometric
analysis of the factors determining mark-up indicates that, con-
trary to received wisdom, one measure of market competition,
trade openness, by itself does not act to reduce profit mark-
up. This may, however, reflect the fact that the exporting firms
being more efficient are able to sustain larger mark-ups. In other
words, the degree of efficiency is itself the entry barrier. More-
over, if anything, it is the presence of foreign firms in an industry
that acts in a competitive way to reduce mark-ups. We also looked
at the degree of competitiveness defined as the Lerner price-cost
margin. Our analysis indicates that the estimated margins are in
general high over the 1990s across all industries. In addition,
the standard entry barriers like returns to scale do not seem to
be operative. Finally, while in the majority of sectors this margin
has not changed over the decade, there seems to be some evidence
of decline in the margin for a sub-set of sectors, indicating that
sector specific competition issues need to be examined.
Our analysis thus indicates that the market by itself does not bring
about competitive outcomes, probably because of the unequal strengths
of the market players. This indicates that the regulatory agencies pro-
bably have a crucial role to ensure a level playing field.
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Notes
1 PCM (Price-cost Margin)= (V-W)/O, where, V=O-M. V is value added,
O is output and M is material inputs, excluding capital charges and W
is wages. All variables are measured in current prices.
Table 8. Coefficient of Regression Model 2 Estimation
Sector Z Dk
Auto ancillary 1.348 -0.001
Automobile 1.299 -0.062
Beverages and tobacco 1.028 -0.339
Cotton textiles 1.136 0
Drugs and pharmaceuticals 1.564 -0.035
Electrical machinary 1.315 -0.005
Electronics 1.176 0.004
Fertilisers 0.991 -0.093
Food products 1.054 0
Inorganic chemicals 1.111 -0.075
Metals and metal product 1.088 -0.008
Non-electrical machinary 1.131 -0.005
Non-metallic minerals 1.55 0.006
Organic chemicals 1.126 -0.025
Other chemicals 1.103 -0.193
Other textiles 0.005 -0.068
Petroleum products 1.197 0.001
Plastic products 1.689 0.004
Polymers 1.396 -0.016
Soaps and toiletries 1.216 -0.173
Synthetic textiles 0.704 -0.043
Trading 1.572 0.001
Transport service 1.559 -0.334
Tyres and rubbers 1.312 -0.015
Notes: In case of coefficient of z, the price-cost margin, it is not significant for
other textiles and significant at 1 per cent level for all other sectors. In
case of returns to scale it is significant for seven sectors (bold dk) and
insignificant in all other sectors. The regression was run as a pooled
cross-section time series panel regression for the period 1989-2001.
The coefficients are the averages for the period.
Table 9: Changes in Lerner Index, 1989-2001
Sectors Z2-Z1 Significance Level
Auto ancillary + ve *
Automobile No difference
Beverages and tobacco + ve *
Cotton textiles No difference
Drugs and pharmaceuticals + ve *
Electrical machinery No difference
Electronics - ve *
Fertilisers - ve *
Food products - ve *
Inorganic chemicals No difference
Metals and metal product - ve *
Non-electrical machinery No difference
Non-metallic minerals - ve *
Organic chemicals + ve *
Other chemicals - ve *
Other textiles - ve *
Petroleum products + ve *
Plastic products + ve *
Polymers + ve *
Soaps and toiletries No difference
Synthetic textiles - ve *
Trading - ve *
Transport services No difference
Tyres and rubbers - ve *
NB: Z2 is the index for the period 1996-2001 and Z1 for 1989-1995. A positive
value in column two indicates that the index is higher in the second period.
The star (*) indicates statistically significant difference at 5 per cent level.

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2 In the literature surveyed above, the mark-up has been variously defined
as profit mark-up or price mark-up. The latter is defined as the Lerner
index, which equals (price-marginal cost)/marginal cost. While it is
obvious that both the measures are positively related we have used the
former measure as it amenable to calculation given our database. Under
the assumption of constant returns to scale the Lerner index is the same
as the profit mark-up.
3 The 24 industries that were included for this study are: Auto ancillary,
automobile, beverages and tobacco, cotton textiles, drugs and
pharmaceuticals, dyes, electrical machinary, electronics, fertilisers, food
products, inorganic chemicals, non-electrical machinery, organic chemicals,
other chemicals, other textiles, paints and varnishes, pesticides, petroleum
products, plastics, polymers, soaps and toileteries, synthetic textiles and
transport services. Of these six industries were excluded because of zero
observation on the dependent variables and/or because the number of firms
in the industry were less than 10. The industries excluded are organic
chemicals, polymers, dyes, paints, pesticides and inorganic chemical s
leaving us with 18 industries.
4 The industries that were included in this model are: Auto ancillary,
automobile, beverages and tobacco, cotton textiles, drugs and
pharmaceuticals, electrical machinary, electronics, fertilisers, food products,
inorganic chemicals, metals and metal product, non-electrical machinary,
non-metallic minerals, organic chemicals, other chemicals, other textiles,
petroleum products, plastic products, polymers, soaps and toiletries,
synthetic textiles, trading, transport service and tyres and rubbers.
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